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LARRY S. EUBANKS* and MICHAEL J. MUELLER**
An Economic Analysis of
Oklahoma's Oil and Gas Forced
Pooling Law-
INTRODUCTION
Numerous statutes exist which influence and constrain the development
of petroleum resources. The purpose of this article is to explore the
economic implications of one of the statutes affecting petroleum devel-
opment in Oklahoma. Oklahoma was one of the first states to enact
compulsory pooling legislation. Although the reasons for compulsory
pooling primarily focus on conservation, this analysis suggests that there
are increased incentives to develop petroleum as a result of Oklahoma's
forced pooling law. At a time when the United States has been pursuing
efforts to increase production such a statute may be especially useful.
However, many owners of petroleum rights will not find this law to their
advantage because the compulsion involved may result in a decrease in
the wealth they can obtain from their petroleum resources.
THE FORCED POOLING LAW
The current Oklahoma forced pooling law was first passed in 1947 and
has not been materially changed since then.' It allows the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission, which is the state's oil and gas regulatory
authority, to issue orders that require owners of separately owned tracts
within a spaced drilling unit to pool their interests in the underlying deposit
and operate as a unit. The owners may also pool voluntarily. This law is
based on the doctrine of correlative rights and prevention of waste as
*Assistant Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs.
**Assistant Professor of Economics, Clarkson University.
tThe authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Oil-Law Record Cor-
poration and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission in collecting the data reported in Table 1, and
also the efforts of Dan Gorin as research assistant. Partial funding for research was provided by a
grant from the Energy Resources Center at the University of Oklahoma. Also of benefit have been
helpful discussions with Harry Benham, Arnold Parr, Charles Trattner, and participants in the Eco-
nomics Workshop at the University of Oklahoma.
1. The forced pooling law is found in OKLA. STAT. Supp. tit. 52, §87.1(e) (1985). Sections
87. l(a)-(d) deal with well spacing and drilling units. The first Oklahoma forced pooling statute was
passed in 1935, 1935 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 59, § 3; OKLA. STAT. ANrN. tit. 52, §§ 85-87, 136-
38. The Oklahoma Statute was found to be constitutionally valid in Patterson v. Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83, app. dismissed, 305 U.S 376 (1939); Croxton v. State, 186
Okla. 249, 97 P.2d 11 (1939).
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established in a series of pioneer statutes and court cases in Oklahoma
between 1909 and 1915.2
To understand pooling, it is first necessary to understand the spacing
and drilling unit procedures.' The spaced drilling unit to which forced
pooling may be applied is specified in a spacing order issued by the
Corporation Commission upon proper application and a public hearing.
The order also specifies the number of wells which may be drilled on the
unit and their exact geographic location. The Commission has consid-
erable flexibility but generally it specifies one well per unit, located at
the center of the unit which is typically a square of 10 to 640 acres.
Except for areas of the state with no previous drilling activity, the acreage
specified follows that set for other units in the area. Over time the trend
has been toward larger units because costs per well have increased. 4
Typically an oil well is given 160 or 320 acres, and a gas well 640 acres.
Once a spacing and drilling order is in effect, any individual or firm
that owns any portion of the land within the unit or has the right to drill
on any portion may apply for a pooling order.' The pooling order offers
owners who have not already entered voluntarily into a drilling agreement
a choice of either paying their proportionate share of the drilling and
completion costs and receiving the same share as a percentage of the
working interest or of receiving a bonus in lieu of the right to participate
in the working interest. The pooling order lists the estimated cost of the
well proposed and the bonus offered. The owners are given a specified
2. S.L. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1971). A detailed description of the law and its implementation in Oklahoma is provided by Nesbitt,
A Primer on Forced Pooling of Oil and Gas Interest in Oklahoma, 50 OKLA. B.J. 648 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Nesbitt, Primer], and Nesbitt, The Forced Pooling Order: How Long? How
Wide? How Deep?, 52 OKLA. B.J. 2799, 2799-805 (1981).
3. In order to avoid a common misunderstanding, note that pooling is not the same thing as
"unitization." Unitization is the joint operation and sharing of production from a complete reservoir
or deposit by all owners and is often seen to be the solution to the so-called common property nature
of petroleum, i.e., the solution in the sense that unified operation results in allocatively efficient
output. Pooling has no relationship to the reservoir since the spacing unit pooled is not defined with
respect to the size of the reservoir.
4. McDONALD, supra note 2, at 167-70.
5. Notice that the effect of this "one-owner" application is that one owner alone can force all
others into a drilling operation. This owner need not actually be in full legal control of even a portion
of the spaced drilling unit. For example, suppose a 120 acre unit is divided by ownership of the
land into eight separately owned tracts not necessarily of equal size. Further, suppose one of those
tracts is nine acres whose ownership is held by four siblings as the result of an inheritance. The
siblings then have an undivided interest in the nine acres and are considered co-tenants in the mineral
rights. The nine acres could not be sold, either in fee simple or just the subsurface mineral rights,
unless all four siblings agreed. However, one of the four could lease her mineral rights to an oil
and gas firm and that firm could apply for a pooling order. This would force the other three siblings
as well as owners of the seven tracts to make a decision. Also, the lease itself can be sold or traded
by the original lesee, opening up endless possibilities to the oil and gas industry for securing a
toehold-control needed to facilitate drilling.
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period, usually fifteen days, in which to elect to participate or to receive
the bonus. 6 Note also that if an election choice is not received in writing
within the specified period, the owner is deemed to have elected the
bonus. Bonuses and well participation shares usually must be paid within
thirty days from the end of the election period. Finally, the pooling order
specifies a date by which drilling must begin, usually 120 days or less
from the date of the order. The purpose of the public hearing for each
pooling order is to give all interested parties an opportunity to present
their concerns and evidence. The trial examiner expects to hear expert
testimony substantiating the applicants' statements about the cost of drill-
ing and completion, and the reasonableness of the bonus offered. Both
claims are judged based on "going rates" for similar situations nearby.
In fact, the bonus is usually required by the trial examiner to be equal
to bonuses paid recently to owners of adjoining drilling units.
One more point that needs to be explained concerns designation of the
operator of the well. This is the individual or firm that receives the
payments for participation, pays the bonuses to nonparticipants, and ac-
tually makes the decisions to employ the factors of production to drill
the well, complete it if it is successful, and operate it. Operation involves
controlling the rate of output and selling the oil and gas produced. The
operator also is responsible to divide the revenues received between the
working and royalty interests. Usually the applicant for a forced pooling
order wants to be the operator and will be designated as such in the order
unless contested at the public hearing. In this case the owner of the largest
share of the working interest is usually designated as operator, unless
there is evidence of ongoing exploration or development activity by an-
other owner. Operator status can be very important financially because
the working interest of nonparticipating owners inures directly to the
operator, unless other participants claim a share at the hearing and as a
result it is divided by the order.
Without the forced pooling law, an individual or firm seeking to drill
a well must have voluntary agreements with all the interests in the drilling
unit before drilling is allowed to commence. The essence of Oklahoma's
forced pooling law is that a single interest in a spaced drilling unit may
choose to obtain voluntary agreements from all other interests, or it may
choose to invoke the power of the state to compel all other interests to
either participate in developing the petroleum resource in question or to
grant a lease for development of the resource. It might seem that forced
6. The statute itself is very general and does not provide for these specific details concerning the
way in which forced pooling is implemented. Such details were left to be provided by the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission. Nesbitt, Primer, supra note 2, provides the details concerning the way
in which the Oklahoma Corporation Commission has chosen to implement the forced pooling statute.
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pooling would be so advantageous that all wells would be drilled through
the compulsion of forced pooling orders. However, this has not been the
case historically.
Table 1 presents information concerning the historical use of forced
pooling in Oklahoma. Following enactment of the statute in 1947, the
number of pooling orders issued per year has increased. Since the early
1970s, the number has grown at an accelerating rate. Perhaps it is more
interesting to note that the percentage of total wells drilled each year
which are drilled under forced pooling orders also has increased signif-
icantly over this time period. Table 1 shows that one-half percent of wells
drilled at the beginning of the period were forced pooled and that this
increased thirty to forty fold by the early 1980s. The largest percentage
of wells pooled was about 39 percent in 1979. Certainly the total number
of wells drilled annually will be determined by economic factors such as
the price of petroleum, the cost of drilling, interest rates, and the general
level of economic activity. Changes in such influences can also be ex-
pected to explain changes in the total number of wells drilled. It is not
immediately clear how changes in these economic variables should be
expected to result in such a significant increase in the percent of wells
which are drilled under forced pooling orders. The analysis in the fol-
lowing section will provide some insight into a number of potential ex-
planations for changes in the percent of wells which are forced pooled.
THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF FORCED POOLING
The economic effects of forced pooling are theoretically explored in
this section. Simply stated, Oklahoma's forced pooling law operates in
several specific ways to increase petroleum development and production
activity. In order to understand the economic effects of forced pooling it
is useful to begin with a discussion of the decisionmaking process gen-
erally involved in the development of petroleum resources. This process
is described first without forced pooling and then as changed by forced
pooling.
Figure 1 depicts the decisionmaking sequence, with sequence A rep-
resenting the sequence without forced pooling and B the sequence with
forced pooling. A displays a sequence of decisionmaking steps labeled 1
through 7, but no indication is intended concerning the time involved at
each step.7
In step one the firm learns of a drilling possibility, either as a result
of its own activities, or from information brought to it by another firm
interested in putting together some type of joint activity. At this point the
7. See C.J. GRAYSON, DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: DRILLING DECISIONS BY OIL AND GAS
OPERATORS (1960).
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Table 1. Use of Forced Pooling Orders in Oklahoma'
Pooling Wells Ratio of Orders
Year Orders Drilled to Wells
1948 18 4267 .0042
1949 21 4308 .0049
1950 27 5365 .0050
1951 34 5449 .0062
1952 34 5628 .0060
1953 35 7460 .0047
1954 50 8458 .0059
1955 66 8078 .0082
1956 68 7622 .0089
1957 70 5918 .0118
1958 72 6354 .0113
1959 89 5359 .0166
1960 97 4802 .0160
1961 89 5845 .0152
1962 82 5203 .0158
1963 94 4492 .0209
1964 161 4516 .0357
1965 212 4490 .0472
1966 286 4112 .0676
1967 246 3124 .0787
1968 218 2703 .0807
1969 273 2886 .0946
1970 279 2449 .1139
1971 279 2119 .1271
1972 358 2195 .1631
1973 538 2290 .2349
1974 708 3105 .2280
1975 921 3616 .2547
1976 1261 4164 .3028
1977 1576 4919 .3204
1978 1970 5589 .3528
1979 2444 6286 .3888
1980 2760 8932 .3090
1981 3943 11,699 .3370
a. Sources for these data are: Oklahoma Corporation Commission; personal letter from Paul M.
Peterson, Oil-Law Records Corp, to Michael Mueller (June 23, 1982); 111-3 AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE, BASIC PETROLEUM DATA BOOK (1983).
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firm must evaluate the information and decide if the possibility of dis-
covering petroleum looks probable enough to initiate a venture eventually
leading to drilling a well. The second step is to put together ownership
or control of drilling rights to the acreage needed. This may involve
buying land and mineral rights, buying drilling leases, and/or entering
into deals or trades with other firms that own land or leases on the needed
unit. The firm may already have control of some or all of the unit, because
of past purchases, leases, or deals undertaken to secure some acreage at
favorable prices. Because acreage required for drilling may involve con-
siderable expenditures or commitments to others, it necessarily follows
upon a firm's positive decision in step one. The expenditures and com-
mitment costs are referred to as bonuses.
After acreage control is acquired it is possible for the firm to raise
capital for drilling. Usually this is a combination of internal funds and
outside investment. Except for the large integrated energy companies,
most firms operate so as to spread risk by using their own capital for
only a portion of the investment cost even if they have sufficient resources
to completely fund a venture. This means control of acreage must be in
hand before others can be convinced to commit investment funds and the
commitment is needed before drilling can be contracted. Steps two and
three are dependent on step one in the sense that the type of prospect'
helps determine the various types of acreage control and investment deals.
The next step is the actual drilling. The firm, according to its various
8. The type of prospect is determined by geological characteristics, expected size, and type of
reservoir, etc.
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agreements and deals, employs a drilling contractor who supplies a drill-
ing rig and crew, and other various contractors as needed to drill and
collect information. In step five, the firm evaluates information generated
in drilling to determine if the well will likely prove to be sufficiently
productive to treat it as a discovery and proceed with completion. If not,
it is called a dry well. If the well is a discovery of some promise which
is an indication that surrounding drilling units may also be productive,
the firm may decide to move immediately to secure acreage control in
order to exploit this information with further development. Of course
other firms observing the drilling will also move as quickly as possible,
but they do not have quite as accurate information. So step five may lead
to step six, completion and simultaneous further development, or to step
seven, completion only. Completion is the installation of equipment needed
for eventual production, such as casing, valves, pipes, and stock tanks.
After production has commenced, additional information about the res-
ervoir is gained which may indicate whether further development in the
area appears worthwhile. Either way, the well will be operated according
to the dictates of petroleum prices and operating costs until decline even-
tually leads to abandonment.
Sequence B in Figure 1 displays the decisionmaking process with forced
pooling available. The principal impact is to effectively combine steps
two and three into parallel activities rather than sequential activities. The
raising of capital no longer must be contingent on full control of drilling
rights because they can always be secured through forced pooling if
voluntary agreement is too expensive, involves too much time, or looks
impossible. Furthermore, this means that the information generated by a
discovery can be internalized to a greater degree because the firm can
use its slight time advantage over observing firms to quickly initiate a
pooling application on adjoining units. Of course a firm must have own-
ership of rights to some portion of a unit to apply for forced pooling. As
explained, only a toehold is needed and is generally easily secured. Figure
1 suggests that a significant consequence of the forced pooling statute is
the reduction in time and effort required to piece together all of the
elements of a drilling venture.9 That is, forced pooling reduces the trans-
actions costs faced by firms in their efforts to develop additional reserves.
The primary economic effects of forced pooling can be described by
examining three markets: the prospecting market, the well market, and
9. At the height of the record-setting rate of drilling wells per month in Oklahoma in 1982, it
took approximately three months from application to issuance of a pooling order. In stark contrast,
drilling must wait upon voluntary agreement of all unleased owners and all leaseholds in units not
forced pooled. Negotiation of such agreements may take months to years, depending upon the
location of owners and the complexity of ownership as well as the personality of the various owners.
As a result, the time lag between the decision to drill and actual drilling may be considerable as
may be the expenses of negotiating an agreement.
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the capital acquisition market. The prospecting market is an input market
that refers to the market for land acreage for use in the production of
petroleum reserves. The well market is a second input market in which
the demand and supply of wells drilled is represented.' 0 The capital
acquisition market is a market in financial capital which the firm uses to
finance its payments for acreage and its investments in wells.
Figure 2 represents the prospecting market and characterizes two of
the primary effects of forced pooling in this market. The quantity traded
in this market is acres leased for drilling and the price should be thought
bonus
b
5
b 
4
b 
3
b2
Acres
Figure 2: The Prospecting Market and The Effects of the
Forced Pooling Law
10. In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the cost or price of a well is measured
in terms of the cost of drilling and completing, or drilling and plugging if dry. No explicit concern
is given to labor as a separate input.
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of as the "bonus" paid per acre to secure the drilling rights." Since acres
of land are inputs into the process by which reserves are produced, the
demand for acres is a derived demand which reflects both the productivity
of acres and the value of the reserves produced.
As the earlier discussion illustrates, acquiring acreage is a costly en-
deavor because it requires the petroleum producing firm to search out
owners of mineral rights and to make contractual agreements with the
owners in order to obtain the requisite mineral leases before production.
Referring to such costs generally as transactions costs, Figure 2 illustrates
the derived demand for acres as D and the derived demand minus the
transactions costs as D.. For simplicity it is assumed that transactions
costs are a constant value per acre obtained. Therefore, Do represents the
willingness to pay by petroleum producing firms directly to acreage own-
ers in order to acquire acreage, given that an amount equal to the distance
represented by (bs-b 2) is paid in transactions costs to obtain each acre.
D. reflects the demand for acres without Oklahoma's forced pooling
statute.
One of the major effects of Oklahoma's forced pooling is to decrease
the transaction costs faced by the petroleum producing firm in acquiring
an acreage position. Because of the forced pooling statute a firm need
obtain only a single lease, rather than operating agreements or leases
from all mineral interests in a spaced unit, in order to make an application
for forced pooling and in effect obtain the right to drill. Figure 2 illustrates
this effect of forced pooling as a shift in the derived demand for acres
from D. to Dp. The transactions cost with forced pooling is illustrated by
(b5-b4) which is smaller than transactions costs without pooling. Thus,
an important result of forced pooling is an effective increase in the demand
for acres.
A second impact of Oklahoma's forced pooling is illustrated in Figure
2 by a shift in the acreage supply curve from S. to Sp. Prior to forced
pooling, individuals with acres to supply for petroleum production op-
erations had a bargaining advantage in negotiating leases that was as-
sociated with the requirement that a producer needed to have control over
all acreage in a drilling unit before drilling activity could begin. Acreage
suppliers would feel that they could "hold-out" in negotiations with any
buyer, knowing that they might be the last to sell and thereby get a higher
bonus per acre. This bargaining advantage is reflected by S, in Figure 2
which represents the prices at which individuals would lease acres given
11. This is a useful simplification of common practice in forced pooling activities. Often the
bonus is represented as a fixed payment per acre plus an "overriding" or "excess" royalty. In
practice, then, the actual payment may vary according to whether the well is successful or not. The
treatment here is a reasonable simplification and assumes the mineral owner being force pooled has
expectations concerning the potential of the well that can be represented by an expected value.
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that they take this bargaining power into account. Forced pooling limits
the supplier's bargaining advantage. Because of forced pooling, acreage
suppliers can no longer "hold-out" in an attempt to extract a higher bonus
per acre. Suppliers now face the threat that the buyer will go to the
Corporation Commission seeking a forced pooling order if the supplier
refuses the buyer's offer. Forced pooling therefore effectively decreases
the supply price schedule for acres, which is represented in Figure 2 by
a shift from S., without forced pooling, to Sp, with forced pooling. 2
Both the decreased transactions costs and the decreased bargaining
power which result from forced pooling operate to increase the number
of acres actually leased for petroleum production activity. Without forced
pooling the equilibrium quantity of acres leased would be determined by
equating demand (D.) to supply (S.) with the resulting leased acreage
being A,. In the presence of pooling, the economic effects result in A2
being leased. Figure 2 shows a situation in which the bonus increases
from b2 to b3 when forced pooling is possible, but this is only one
conceivable qualitative result. It is also possible that the bonus might fall
or even remain unchanged. The effect on price would be dependent on
the relative shifts in demand and supply as a result of forced pooling.
However, these conclusions are an incomplete analysis of the effects
forced pooling has on the prospecting market. In addition to influencing
the transactions costs of acreage demanders and the bargaining power of
acreage suppliers, there is a third and very crucial aspect to the forced
pooling law. The compulsion involved in forced pooling suggests that
acreage suppliers, or mineral owners, are no longer entirely free to choose
when to lease their mineral interests, nor are they entirely free to negotiate
the price of the lease. In effect the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
sets the price per acre, and requires that the mineral owner accept this
price and essentially lease the acreage or participate in the operation of
the well. Since few of the acreage suppliers are readily able to share in
operating the well, a major effect of forced pooling is to compel mineral
owners to lease their mineral rights at prices below their own supply
prices. This is the effect of the forced leasing aspects of Oklahoma's
forced pooling law.
This aspect of forced pooling is depicted in Figure 3 by supply curve
S. With forced pooling the quantity of acreage supplied is horizontal at
1, the price set by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. Acreage
suppliers would ordinarily be willing to supply the prospecting market
with a quantity of acreage greater than A2 only when the price is greater
than b3 per acre. The compulsory leasing aspect of forced pooling requires
12. It is being assumed that the decreased bargaining power can be represented by a constant per
unit decrease in supply price which is equal to (b2-b,).
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Figure 3: The Effects of Price Setting Aspects in Forced Pooling Law
acreage suppliers to supply the quantity of acreage that is demanded at
the price set by the Corporation Commission. 3
At first glance the effect forced pooling has on the transactions costs
for acreage demands, along with the opportunity to face a horizontal
supply curve, seems to be so advantageous that all acreage would be
obtained for petroleum drilling activities by forced pooling. Yet, Table 1
shows that in any year never more than 39 percent of the total number
of wells drilled have taken advantage of forced pooling. Since there are
13. Note the simplification embodied in this analysis. Forced pooling is applicable to single
spaced units. As such the acreage suppliers directly impacted by forced pooling are only those who
own acreage in spaced units which are actually forced pooled. As Table I illustrates, not all wells
are drilled in forced pooled spacing units. The simplification that the market supply for acreage is
horizontal at b is useful in that it depicts the fact that many suppliers will be compelled to supply
more acreage than would otherwise be the case.
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many acres obtained without forced pooling, the entire supply curve for
acres will not be horizontal. Realizing that firms demanding acreage will
not find it in their interest to lease acreage at a price that is higher than
the price set by the Corporation Commission, and that it will also not be
in their interest to pay 5 when the acreage could be obtained at a lower
supply price, the supply curve with forced pooling is going to be dis-
continuous. This is depicted by the portion of supply Sp below point B
in Figure 3 along with the horizontal supply curve 5, which begins with
point F in the diagram.
It must be noted that since firms demanding acreage do not use forced
pooling to obtain all acreage, the advantageous effects forced pooling has
on transactions costs borne by demanders do not apply to all acres leased.
Some drilling units will be obtained by firms negotiating leases for all
acreage as would necessarily be the case without the forced pooling law.
The demand curve for acres obtained in this way is presented by D. in
Figure 3. Of course, only part of this demand curve is relevant when
forced pooling is available. The segment of D. depicted by AB, and
which is above Sp, is relevant since firms demand prices exceed the supply
prices of the acreage owners. Because some acreage must be obtained in
the unconstrained market even under the forced pooling law, and given
competitive forces, A2 will represent the equilibrium quantity of acres
obtained without use of forced pooling. Point B in Figure 3 represents
the equality of the demand and supply for acres without resort to the
involvement of the Corporation Commission and the forced pooling law.
If any additional acreage is demanded it will be the result of a decrease
in transactions costs occasioned by use of the forced pooling law. There-
fore, the demand for the acreage which is located to the right of A2 in
Figure 3 will be depicted by that portion of Dp which lies to the right of
point C.
The results of the forced leasing and price setting aspects of the forced
pooling law are both a discontinuous supply curve and a discontinuous
demand curve for acres. In Figure 3, the demand for acres that will not
be forced pooled is depicted by that portion of D. between and inclusive
of points A and B, and the supply prices for the acres not pooled is
represented by that portion of Sp including and to the left and below point
B. Equating the demand and supply of acreA not pooled results in the
quantity A2. Given the savings in transactions costs due to forced pooling
and that b is the bonus set by the Corporation Commission, the actual
quantity of acres leased for petroleum production will be A1, which
equates the demand and supply of forced pooled acres. Note that the
difference between A and A2 will be the quantity of acres obtained through
forced pooling. These aspects of the forced pooling law, like the impact
[Vol. 26
OKLAHOMA'S FORCED POOLING LAW
of the law on transactions costs and bargaining power, induce an increase
in acreage for petroleum production beyond what would be the case
without forced pooling.
Of course, 5 need not be the price chosen by the Corporation Com-
mission. In order to depict the effects of forced pooling 5 was chosen
somewhat arbitrarily, but not entirely so. It is possible to determine limits
on the price set by the Corporation Commission, and these limits are
depicted in Figure 4 by the bonuses b4 and b 3. If the Corporation Com-
mission set the bonus at b4 , the savings to demanders due to decreased
transactions costs from forced pooling would just be offset by the in-
creased price for the incremental acre beyond A2. As a result, there would
be no use made of the forced pooling law if demanders expected the
Corporation Commission to set the bonus at b4 or higher. Competitive
market forces will tend to drive the price on acres not pooled up to b 3.
Of course, it would be to the advantage of firms to have a price set lower
than b3, but for this to occur there would have to be collusion between$
bonus S
p
b
4 $2
b3 3
II
Acres
0 4
2 
L
3
Figure 4: Limits on the Price Setting Effects of the Forced Pooling Lsw
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acreage demanders to an extent that is unlikely given the larger number
of buyers. This suggests that b3 will be the lowest price that might be set
by the Corporation Commission, and also that the largest quantity of acres
obtained by forced pooling would be A 3-A 2 .
Although there is no strong empirical information available at present
which shows where the Corporation Commission generally chooses a
bonus between b4 and b3, the procedures adopted by the Commission
seem to allow the petroleum development firms the ability to influence
the bonus which is chosen. 14 The intention of the Corporation Commission
is to determine a price which represents the current fair market value of
an oil and gas lease. The current fair market value is taken to be the price
that would be paid, given the conditions, for a lease beteween willing
parties, both of whom are under no compulsion. Typical practice by the
Corporation Commission is to inquire as to the highest price which has
actually been paid for a lease in the vicinity of the spacing unit being
forced pooled.' 5 The petroleum development firms also know this, and
realize that the highest price which has been paid will represent a minimum
price established by the Corporation Commission on a forced pooling
order. Certainly this provides the incentive for the firms demanding acreage
to make offers below their true demand prices. On this matter it has been
written:
While there is some true price competition for oil and gas leases,
primarily in "hot" areas, far more often an operator who contem-
plates exploration will simply decide unilaterally the maximum bonus
he is willing to pay. In negotiating for leases, he simply never offers
more than this amount. Some, notably non-residents and owners of
small interests, will accept the offer, and the rest will be pooled. At
the hearing, these sales or offers are submitted as the bonus which
should be paid to the remaining non-consenting parties.' 6
Although this discussion cannot empirically establish which price is set
in a forced pooling order, it is suggestive that when a firm chooses to
utilize the forced pooling law it probably expects to gain a price advantage
as well as an advantage in terms of decreased transactions costs. Another
way to interpret Figure 3, therefore, is to see petroleum firms making
offers to land owners that would be no greater than b3, finding a few
sellers who will willingly accept such an offer (and Sp shows there are
such acreage suppliers out there), but not spending much additional time
negotiating contracts since a refusal to accept such a take-it-or-leave-it
offer can always be secured through forced pooling.
14. The discussion of Corporation Commission practice relies on Nesbitt, Primer, supra note 2.
15. The "vicinity" is usually taken to be the eight section area adjacent to the section in question.
Id. at 650.
16. Id.
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It is appropriate while discussing Figure 4 to ask if this theoretical
analysis can offer any explanation concerning the historical trend toward
an increasing percentage of wells which are forced pooled. Referring to
this figure it is clear that there are three means by which the proportion
of wells forced pooled would be increased over time.17 First, the price
set by the Corporation Commission might be falling over time relative
to market conditions. Suppose the first price is set at b4 which results in
no use of forced pooling. Assuming the demand and supply curves are
constant, if the Corporation Commission lowers the set price over time,
an increasingly larger share of acreage would be forced pooled as time
passes. Of course, under the conditions of unchanging demand and supply,
the largest proportion of acreage forced pooled would be represented by
the difference A3-A2. Second, assuming a constant demand and set price,
increases in supply prices which would cause the supply curve Sp to shift
upward to the left would result in a larger quantity of acres forced pooled.
What might lead to an increase in supply prices? One possible reason
would be that supplier's expectations concerning future prices are such
that suppliers are expecting higher future prices. For example, if OPEC
activities are successful in pushing prices higher, acreage suppliers may
begin to expect higher prices in the future and require a higher price if
they are to lease their acreage willingly today. Third, transaction cost
savings might decline over time causing Dp to be a greater distance from
Do in Figure 4. Given fixed supply and demand curves and the set price,
the greater the distance between Dp and Do, the larger will be the per-
centage of acres forced pooled. One possible explanation for the larger
transactions cost savings from forced pooling over time might be "learn-
ing-by-doing." 18 After initial passage of the forced pooling statute, un-
familiarity with the statute, legal requirements, and Corporation Commission
practices would probably mean greater transactions costs associated with
pooling than would be the case after learning from the experience of
several and then many efforts to use forced pooling to obtain acreage.
As explanations of the data reported in Table 1, one tends to believe
all three changes probably have occurred over the relevant time period.
Specifically, it appears that the increasing usage of forced pooling during
the first ten-year period after passage of the statute is likely to be explained
by learning-by-doing and economizing on transactions costs associated
with forced pooling itself. The latest dramatic increase in usage of forced
17. Although the quantity in Figure 4 is acres, and the analysis suggests the number of acres
forced pooled and not forced pooled, the analysis also relates to the number of wells forced pooled
because there is a determinate relationship between acres and wells. E.g., an increase in the number
of wells forced pooled would tend to result in an increase in the acres obtained with forced pooling.
18. Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, 29 REV. ECON. STUD. 155-73
(1962).
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pooling seems related to OPEC's ability to control prices in the decade
of the 1970s, and the desire of suppliers to hold back their acreage in
the hope of larger prices in the future. Of course, this reflects only
speculation as there are no reports of any explicit empirical tests of such
hypotheses.
Forced pooling also has an effect on the wealth of acreage owners in
two fundamental ways. First, the decreased bargaining power of acreage
suppliers due to the forced pooling law, which has been depicted in Figure
2 as a decrease in the supply price for each acre, implies that each supplier
perceives a loss in wealth. It is no longer possible to exploit a bargaining
advantage to obtain a higher price per acre which means each acre is
worth less than without forced pooling. Second, the forced leasing and
price setting aspects result in some acreage being leased below its vol-
untary supply price. This implies an additional loss in wealth to some
acreage suppliers, which is depicted in Figure 5 by the shaded triangle
bounded by the points ABC. Note that there may also be a wealth gain
associated with some of the acreage obtained through forced pooling
which is depicted by the shaded area in the triangle bounded by the points
FEC in Figure 5. This wealth gain results if the Corporation Commission
sets a bonus greater than b3, and is due to some acreage that would have
been leased voluntarily at a price between 5 and b3 being paid b by order
of the Corporation Commission.
Forced pooling also has direct effects on the capital acquisition market.
These effects occur primarily through two mechanisms. The first of these
is suggested by Figure 1 and the associated discussion. Forced pooling
makes it possible for the petroleum development firm to decrease the
number of distinct actvities necessary to initiate drilling activity. Because
of forced pooling less time and expense is needed before attempting to
raise monetary capital. This impact implies an outward shift or increase
in the demand for monetary capital which is depicted in Figure 6 by a
shift from demand curve D to demand curve D'. Note that this increase
in demand is supplemented by an indirect effect of forced pooling on the
prospecting market. Firms use monetary capital to finance payments to
inputs and to spread the risk faced in developing petroleum reserves. An
increase in the demand for acreage therefore induces an increase in the
demand for capital. This effect is also illustrated in Figure 6 by the shift
from D to D'. The implication of these effects of forced pooling is an
increase in price and in the amount of financial capital demanded and
supplied to the petroleum industry.
The second mechanism by which forced pooling has an impact on the
capital acquisition market is associated with what may amount to a forced
partnership. A firm making a forced pooling application probably does
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Figure 5: Potential Wealth Loss and Gain to Mineral Owners
Who Are Forced Pooled
so because of the advantages in acreage acquisition due to decreased
transactions costs and/or the price by which most of the acreage can be
obtained. But the legal process of forced pooling allows the nonconsenting
mineral owner the opportunity to elect to participate in the well and to
share in the well's risk of failure and opportunity for profitable production.
The nature of this effect is not immediately clear. The firm invoking the
forced pooling statute may not want partners in its production activities
and, therefore, perceive a risk in forced pooling itself. Of course, the
firm asking for forced pooling might also see the opportunity to spread
the risk of the development activity to other parties who elect to participate
Summer 19861
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Figure 6: Forced Pooling and the Capital Acquisition Market
rather than to accept the bonus under the forced pooling order. In this
case the development firm may economize on the transactions costs as-
sociated with acquiring the financial capital that allows it to spread its
risk because it tends to decrease its time and effort to search out partners
and lenders. Such a situation would also be depicted in Figure 6 by a
shift from D to D'.
Although there is no empirical evidence to suggest which of these
alternatives is correct, one of the reasons used to justify forced pooling
seems to favor the risk spreading alternative. In Oklahoma owners of
mineral rights in a spacing unit are treated as co-tenants. As such, any
mineral owner may develop the petroleum underlying the spacing unit
subject to the obligation to pay the co-tenants their respective shares in
the production minus production costs. If the developing co-tenant drills
a dry hole, it would not be legally possible to obtain payment from the
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other co-tenants for their share of the cost. It is different in the case of
forced pooling, as pointed out: "Thus, a major purpose of forced pooling
is to equalize the risk of loss by forcing non-consenting co-tenants to
choose in advance whether they will share in both the benefits and the
risks of oil and gas exploration."' 9 Thus, many firms asking for forced
pooling orders may desire the risk-spreading opportunities afforded by
forced pooling, in addition to its other advantages.
Forced pooling, through its effects on the prospecting market, will have
an indirect impact on the well market. Specifically, wells are inputs into
the production of reserves that are complimentary to acres as inputs. An
increase in the quantity of acres leased for petroleum development implies
an associated increase in the demand for wells. This is depicted in Figure
7 as a shift from D to D'. As a result of forced pooling the demand for
wells increases, ceteris paribus, which leads to a higher price per well
Price
PW4-
I I
I I
I I D
I I
I I
W W' # of Wells
Figure 7: Effects of Forced Pooling on the Market for Petroleum Wells
19. Nesbitt, Primer, supra note 2, at 85.
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and a larger number of wells demanded, supplied, and in operation at
any point in time.
There seems to be another effect of forced pooling which may not be
as obvious as the effects which have been discussed above. Activity which
produces petroleum also produces information that is of relevance to other
potential production activities. The information which is produced when
a firm drills for petroleum may generate a beneficial externality to other
petroleum production firms. One of the effects of forced pooling appears
to be at least a partial internalization of this externality.
The information spillover at issue here results from the normal pro-
duction activities of firms while drilling for petroleum. Individual drilling
activities produce information about the likelihood of a successful well
nearby. Certainly the firm which is engaged in the drilling gains much
precise and specific information about formations and productive potential
such as the possible rate of production from a well. Nonetheless, the fact
that a well is successful or even unsuccessful provides information to
other drilling enterprises concerning the probability that other drilling
ventures on surrounding spacing units will or will not be successful. Such
information is certainly of value to the firms that are only observing from
a distance. The firm producing this information cannot exclude these
other firms from obtaining such information, and therefore is unable to
appropriate the value of the information it generates for the other firms.
This set of circumstances represents a beneficial externality which is
produced by one firm and provided without payment to other firms.
Such beneficial externalities are certainly of importance to evaluating
the social optimality of resource uses. Traditional wisdom on such ex-
ternalities is that since the externality generating firm cannot appropriate
the full social value of its activities, it will not utilize the resources at its
command in a socially efficient manner. Specifically, it will produce too
little of the good which results in the beneficial externality. In the case
under discussion, the suggestion is that too little development and pro-
duction activity which is producing information concerning the presence
or absence of economic quantities of petroleum reserves is being under-
taken.
If the firm engaged in petroleum development or exploration activities
could appropriate the value of the information it generates then it would
tend to increase its production of such information, which is the appro-
priate thing to do from the point of view of using society's resources
efficiently. Because forced pooling decreases the time and resources that
a firm must devote to getting a drilling activity underway, the firm may
have gained, at least to some extent, an increased ability to exclude other
firms from appropriating the value of the information it is producing.
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Certainly the above discussion of the effects of forced pooling suggests
that forced pooling increases petroleum development and production ac-
tivity, which is desirable when evaluated from the perspective of the
information externality and social efficiency.
However, it is not clear, at least in a theoretical discussion, how far
forced pooling actually goes in internalizing the information spillover.
Forced pooling does not allow the producing firm to actually exclude
other firms from information it produces; it only allows the firm producing
the information to be better able to utilize the information itself. The
producing firm has more complete information on which to act than will
the firm observing its activity from afar. The firms which are the receptors
of the information spillover may learn that it might be beneficial to
consider production nearby, but they will not have as much precise in-
formation that would describe how good a prospect nearby production
might be. Forced pooling allows the firm generating the information to
act quickly and secure its gains when it learns it would be profitable to
drill on an adjacent spacing unit. Therefore, the firm which generates the
spillover may effectively exclude other firms from utilizing the infor-
mation it has generated by acting quickly. Yet forced pooling does not
really result in the ability to exclude others from using the information
generated; rather, it only allows the firm perhaps to be more successful
in making its own use of the information it has generated.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
There are two recent developments in Oklahoma Corporation Com-
mission policy of special interest to the discussion presented above. The
Corporation Commission now requires that the party attempting to force
pool must make a good faith effort to obtain voluntary agreements before
applying to the Commission to invoke the compulsion of forced pooling.20
The test of whether the applying party has made a good faith effort results
in essentially the requirement that the information that will be provided
to the nonconsenting owner by the forced pooling order be provided in
writing by the applying party to the mineral owners prior to application
for forced pooling. It is also required that a reasonable period of time
must elapse before a forced pooling application can be filed. The effect
of this change in policy would be represented in Figures 2-5 by an inward
shift in the demand for acres obtained by forced pooling (Dp), since this
change in policy decreases the savings in transactions costs associated
with forced pooling. This policy change will have no effect on the demand
20. OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION, Esco EXPLORATION (1984) (CD 108743, Order No.
264785).
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for acres not forced pooled. As a result, there will be both a decrease in
the total number of acres forced pooled and in the total number of acres
in petroleum development activities. This change in policy also decreases
the ability of the producing firm to utilize the information it produces in
a timely fashion.
The second policy change is that it has now been made explicit that
the nonconsenting mineral interest being forced pooled can make two
elections, rather than one. It is possible to elect both to participate in the
working interest of the well and to take the bonus on a selective portion
of the acreage being forced pooled. 2' This apparently means that the
individual being forced pooled and owning 100 acres, for example, could
elect to take the bonus on 99 acres and participate in the well with only
one acre or, perhaps, even less. This would allow the individual, as a
working interest, to obtain all of the information produced by the drilling
activity. Certainly this implies that such information can be obtained at
a modest expense, and it also functions to minimize the ability of the
development firm to exclude others from information it produces. Of
course, this policy results in the firm being able to appropriate part of
the value of the information it provides for others, but this appropriated
payment seems likely to be less than what would be the market value for
the information.22 It will be interesting to observe the number of small
acreage participation elections in the future, and the implied cost of
obtaining well information. It should perhaps be noted that this policy
change seems to confirm the relevance of the above discussion of infor-
mation spillover, as it shows that one aspect of forced pooling that the
petroleum industry has found important is its impact on information pro-
duction and availability.
CONCLUSION
Often economic policy analysis neglects a specific analysis of insti-
tutions affecting resource allocation when exploring the implications of
public policy. While this inattention to institutional detail may not always
lead to a weak or incomplete analysis, there are cases in which institutional
details are quite relevant. This article has examined such a case, that of
Oklahoma's forced pooling of oil and gas interests. Oklahoma allows a
single individual to initiate the drilling of a well, although many separate
interests are involved, and even though many of the interests may not
voluntarily consent to such development. Certainly the legal system seeks
21. Apparently it has always been possible to make this variable election. However, Corporation
Commission practice prior to 1984 did not explicitly inform the party being forced pooled of this
possibility on the pooling order itself. This practice was changed in 1984 as a result of a review
and revision of the form used for pooling orders. The revised form used in establishing the pooling
order now explicitly recognizes the possibility of the variable election.
22. Assuming a spacing unit of 640 acres and a completed well cost of $2 million, participating
with one acre implies a cost of $3,127 to obtain this information.
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to protect the interests of the nonconsenting mineral owner. But the
theoretical analysis presented above shows clearly that the wealth of
mineral owners is likely to be decreased because they may be forced to
lease their mineral interests for development at a value below the mini-
mum value they would accept without the compulsion of the forced
pooling statute.
One popular theme in public policy debates concerning energy policy
is that the public sector, and especially the federal government, should
get out of the energy marketplace. Such arguments seem to rely on general
arguments concerning the virtues of the private marketplace and private
enterprise. However, analysis of Oklahoma's forced pooling law suggests
that such arguments may be superficial and that, in any case, there are
legal institutions that pervade energy markets even on a local, state, or
regional level. Perhaps abstract economic theory can sensibly represent
a "free" market, but what an actual "free" market in petroleum would
consist of is not clear.
Historically, Oklahoma's forced pooling law is just one part of a long
and continuing process by which the public sector has attempted to re-
spond to allocational problems arising in a free market for petroleum
development. Basically, the public sector in its role of defining and en-
forcing property rights has become an integral part of the oil and gas
market in order to protect its definition of appropriate property interests
in petroleum. In this system, a basic definition of property has been
modified and constrained to account for "problems" arising at various
points in time. Early in the development of petroleum the problem was
waste and conservation; more recently the problem has been perceived
as too little petroleum development. It is the latter problem to which
Oklahoma's forced pooling statute responds.
As this discussion argues, forced pooling through decreases in trans-
actions costs, decreased bargaining power of landowners, and price set-
ting, induces an increase in petroleum development, with other things
remaining constant. Forced pooling will increase the number of acres and
the number of wells used to produce petroleum. As the historical view
of forced pooling indicates, the use of forced pooling has increased,
particularly in the 1970s when America faced several energy crises. Al-
though the analysis of forced pooling in Oklahoma presented here has
suggested clear implications about the direction of changes in economic
variables, little information exists concerning the quantitative magnitude
of these effects of forced pooling.23
23. The quantitative magnitude of forced pooling is the subject of continuing research. Mueller
& Eubanks, Institutional Effects on an In Situ Natural Resource Market: Forced Pooling in a
Petroleum Reserves Market, 53 S. ECON. J. (forthcoming Oct. 1986) present an empirical investi-
gation of forced pooling in Oklahoma. It is hoped that future research can examine the impact of
forced pooling in other states as well as in Oklahoma.
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